Remarks by Lisa Ikemoto

Remarks by Lisa Ikemoto

Reflections on First Day of Tarrytown Meetings 2010

Introduction

- Good morning

- I have selected a few of the many threads that I heard, so my comments will be even more selective than my notes

- This is about what I heard, not necessarily about what was said; with a few of my own observations and questions thrown in.

The nature of genetic technology, and on science and technology, more generally

The "genetics revolution" is creating a "new threshold" (Marsha Darling). For the most part, comments I heard on the nature and effect of genetic technology, on new biotechnologies, agreed with the notion that these technologies are different, new, greater change agents, if you will.

Genetic determinism, genetic essentialism, geneticization are concepts we used yesterday to describe the new ways in which we define ourselves, each other, our relationships, our communities. And we use those terms critically, not descriptively.

At the same time, the new biotech provides new vehicles for historically rooted ideologies and practices such as biological race and eugenics.

We face new difficulties in proving the pernicious uses of these technologies for at least a couple of reasons:

  • The popular belief that biotech will overcome social stratification
  • The claim that science is real – Dorothy Roberts used as example, Sally Satel's distinction that positions genetic race as truth and social race as ideology.

As some put it, science is a kind of faith, and there is an overwhelming faith in science and scientists.

I would push a little on that idea. I think it might be more useful to say that the faith in science is premised on the privilege we give to knowledge we call "science." i.e. Science is a form of privileged knowledge. That privilege reflects, in part, the greater value placed on technological expertise and on the idea of neutrality, as opposed to cultural knowledge, experiential knowledge, social knowledge (which are regarded as subjective, natural, feminine, indigenous, primitive, and therefore less valuable).

So perhaps one additional question is: how are we ourselves using the appeal of neutral principles – our neutral priniciples -- in ways that undercut the ways we have challenged the neutrality of science?

Another set of threads about new technologies and the market place

Throughout the afternoon, there were critical comments about the role of the market in technology development, use, and distribution. For the most part, I heard those comments as a critique of neoliberalism, and perhaps as concern about slippage between the liberal notion of autonomy-based choice into free market individualism. There were some modulating voices. Jonathan Kahn called for discussion about balance between the market, individual needs, responsibility, and civil society. Others spoke against demonization of the market.

What I thought interesting was the way we use "market" as if there is a monolithic and independent entity. Perhaps we need to break that down. I also found interesting Joe Stramondo's discussion about the generational difference in the community of Little People about willingness to talk about the double dominance effect. He pointed to the older generation's use of libertarianism to avoid the discussion, and the way the younger generation at LPA used clinics' imposition of genetic norms to raise the discussion. He pointed to the double edge of free market thinking.

Throughout the day, we elaborated on the idea that Carmel Shalev first stated -- technology creates dependency. So by the end of the day, the trajectory had been laid out – availability of the technology turns into desire, which then ratchets up into need, then expectation and pressure to use it, and then (as Lena Gugucheva said) to a claim of right.

This trajectory rests on the fact that the existence of a technology also defines the problem it apparently fixes. For the most part, genetic technologies are fixes that define problems as individual. That is, they frame the problem as located within the body, and divert our attention from socially located root causes.

Symbolic harm and commodification

Adrienne Asch called upon us to consider why society should care about symbolic harms, and to show why symbolic harms might be more than symbolic.

There was a continuing thread of commentary on symbolic harm -- on commodification, in particular.

Marsha Darling, Carmel Shalev and others provided a strong critique of ways in which new genetic technologies commodify the body and women's bodies, especially. In the roundtable discussion about intergenerational concerns, one speaker observed that commodification concerns resonate less than tangible harms with the younger generation. There were several conversations that got to the ways in which notions of "choice" and "agency" are used to counter commodification concerns. At the same time, perhaps, there's a sense or assumption that we are so extensively commodified that expanding commodification of oneself is an act of agency.

Perhaps in continuing this discussion, we could include these three points. First is Margaret Radin's point that there is a continuum or trajectory from objectification to commodification to subordination. Subordination cannot exist without commodification.

The next two points have been made by Rene Zelizer, among others: One is that we can hold intrinsic value and extrinsic value simultaneously. Commodification does not always completely erase the other ways we value humanity. We might ourselves, then, think about the ways in which commodification acts in concert with other forces – patriarchy and white supremacy, to accomplish complete commodification. And the other point from Zelizer's work is that things we have commodified do not always stay that way. [e.g. children]. Commodification is not a one-way street.